Monetary Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting Countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland by Mariusz Jarmuzek et al.








Mariusz Jarmuzek, Lucjan T. Orlowski, Artur Radziwill
Monetary Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting Countries: the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
Warsaw, June 2004Materials  published  here  have  a  working  paper  character.  They  can  be  subject  to  further
publication. The views and opinions expressed here reflect the  author(s) point of view and not
necessarily those of the CASE.
This research was supported by a grant from the CERGE-EI Foundation under a program of
the Global Development Network. Additional funds for grantees in the Balkan countries have been
provided by the Austrian Government through WIIW, Vienna. All opinions expressed are those of
the author(s) and have not been endorsed by CERGE-EI, WIIW, or the GDN.
Keywords: monetary policy, institutional and behavioural transparency, direct inflation
targeting, EU New Member States, European Monetary Union.
Acknowledgements
The paper has benefited from comments by Wiji Arulampalam, Stephen Broadberry, Marek
Dabrowski, Jens Hölscher, Dennis Leech, Marcus Miller, and Andrzej Slawinski. Special thanks
are expressed to Halina B. Orlowski for extensive comments as well as conceptual and editorial
assistance. The authors are solely responsible for all errors and omissions.
© CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw 2004
Graphic Design: Agnieszka Natalia Bury
ISSN 1506-1701, ISBN: 83-7178-344-2
Publisher:
CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research
12 Sienkiewicza, 00-944 Warsaw, Poland




2. Theoretical Underpinnings of Monetary Policy  Transparency ................................7
     2.1. Institutional Transparency: The Eijffinger-Geraats Model ................................8
     2.2. Behavioural Transparency: the Haldane-Read Model.....................................10
3.  Institutional Measure of Transparency....................................................................11
     3.1. Eijffinger and Geraats Index for NMS...............................................................11
     3.2. DIT Extension of Eijffinger and Geraats Index for NMS ..................................14
4. Behavioural Measures of Transparency: Empirical results....................................17
5. The Link Between Institutional and Behavioural Transparency.............................20
6. Concluding Remarks.................................................................................................21
References .....................................................................................................................23
Appendix 1: Eijffinger and Geraats Index Questionnaire............................................25
Appendix 2: Questionnaire Extending EG index for DIT countries............................27
Appendix 3.  Econometric Results ...............................................................................28 
                Studies & Analyses No. 281 – Monetary Policy Transparency in the Inflation ...
4
Mariusz Jarmużek
Mariusz Jarmuzek has been associated with the CASE Foundation since 1997. His research
interests cover development and transition economics, monetary and fiscal policy, exchange
rate economics, and political economy of transformation. Between 2000-2002 he worked as a
member of the USAID advisory mission to the President of Georgia, and was also involved in
consultancy projects to the Ministry of Finance, the Warsaw Stock Exchange, and the Polish
Bank for Development. He was an intern at the World Bank, the National Bank of Poland, and
ING  Barings.  He  is  on  leave  from  the  National  Bank  of  Poland  where  he  serves  as  an
economist in the Office of the Governor,  and  has  been working  for the  University  College
London since 2004. Mariusz Jarmuzek graduated from the University of Lódź and currently
participates in the postgraduate programme at the University of Warwick
Lucjan T. Orlowski
Lucjan T. Orłowski is professor of economics and international finance and the chairman of the
Department of Economics and Finance at Sacred Heart University, Fairfield, Connecticut, USA.
His research focuses on monetary economics and stabilization policies in transition economies
as  well  as  emerging  international  financial  markets.  He  has  authored  three  books  and
numerous  articles  in  international  refereed  journals.  He  serves  on  editorial  boards  of
‘Comparative Economic Studies’, ‘Emerging Markets Finance and Trade’. Professor Orłowski
is a senior research fellow and a member of the Advisory Council of the CASE Foundation. He
is also a senior fellow at the University of Bonn - Center for  European Integration Studies.




Artur Radziwiłł is a Vice President of the CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research. He is
professionally interested in monetary integration, public finance and labour markets. He obtained
his  MA  degree  in  Economics  from  University  of  Sussex  and Warsaw University (Summa  Cum
Laude). He also studied at Columbia University and Joint Vienna Institute. He continues his Ph.D.
research at University of London. He worked as an adviser to the Prime Minister of Moldova and
as  an  expert  for  the  World  Bank,  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme,  International
Labour Organisation, German  Technical  Cooperation  (GTZ)  and  Global  Development  Network.
Artur Radziwiłł is also a member of the Polish Economic Outlook team. He participated in many




This paper quantifies transparency of monetary policy in the three EU New Member States that
have adopted direct inflation targeting strategy. Two measures of transparency are applied. The
institutional measure reflects the extent to which a central bank discloses information that is related
to  the  policymaking  process.  The  behavioural  measure  reflects  the  clarity  among  the  financial
market participants about the true course of monetary policy. The paper  shows  an  ambiguous
association  between  the  two  measures  of  transparency,  which  may  be  attributed  to  the  active
exchange  rate  management  policy  that  undermines  the  actual  transparency  proxied  by  the
behavioural measure. 
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1. Introduction
The  main  objective  of  this  study  is  to  evaluate  monetary  policy  transparency  in  the  three
European Union (EU) New Member States (NMS) that have adopted direct inflation targeting (DIT)
strategy, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The common challenge for these NMS is to
meet the Maastricht criteria and to harmonise their monetary policies with that of the European
Central Bank (ECB) on their road to the European Monetary Union (EMU). The main presumption
of this paper is that the EMU candidates need to foster monetary policy transparency to the degree
commensurate with that followed by the ECB. In this sense, reaching a comparable degree of
transparency can be viewed as a critical criterion of a successful monetary convergence to the
euro. The ECB transparency, therefore, serves as a benchmark for evaluating our results. The
ECB does not follow the DIT strategy, nevertheless it has a well-prescribed inflation target and its
policy is considered seemingly transparent.
For the purpose of our analysis, we define transparency as a far-reaching communication of
monetary policy goals, strategies and operational tactics to the public at large. We evaluate two
aspects  of  transparency:  the  institutional  and  the  behavioural.  The  institutional  transparency  is
understood  as  the  extent  to  which  central  bank  discloses  information  that  is  related  to  the
policymaking process, and the behavioural transparency is defined as the clarity among financial
market participants about the true course of monetary policy.  We further analyse the link between
the institutional and the behavioural transparency and we put forth some hypothesis explaining a
seemingly weak association between the two.
We measure  the  institutional  transparency  by  employing  the  methodology  of  Eijffinger  and
Geraats (2002). By adopting their survey questions we obtain the Eijffinger and Geraats (EG) index
for  the  three  NMS.  The  behavioural  measure  is  based  on  the  econometric  model  originally
proposed by Haldane and Reed (2000) and modified in our study to account for specific conditions
of the three NMS. We believe that our dual approach to measuring monetary policy transparency
brings a new dimension to the literature addressing various aspects of monetary convergence to
the EMU.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 elaborates on theoretical foundations of monetary
policy  transparency  with  distinguishing  between  the  institutional  and  behavioural  measures.
Section  3  presents  the  empirical  investigation  of  the  institutional  transparency  by  assessing
information disclosure patterns. Section 4 measures the behavioural transparency and Section 5
examines the link between both measures. Section 6 encapsulates our findings.Studies & Analyses No. 281 M. Jarmużek, L.T. Orłowski, A. Radziwiłł                                                       
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2. Theoretical Underpinnings of Monetary Policy Transparency
In  general  terms,  transparency  of  monetary  policy  can  be  ascertained  as  a  degree  of
information asymmetry between the monetary authority and the public at large.  Specifically, a
transparent central bank is prone to disclose full information about the policy goals, strategies and
tactics (Bernanke, et. al., 1999) as well as modelling assumptions, methods, and official forecasts.
By doing so, it diminishes the degree of asymmetric information relative to the public at large.
In essence, transparency is considered an important feature in the design of a modern central
banking (Chortareas et al., 2003). According to the survey results of 91 central banks conducted by
Fry  et  al.  (2000),  74%  of  them  consider  transparency  as  important  or  very  important.  This
importance is also underscored by the IMF (1999) in its “Code of Good Practices on Transparency
in Monetary and Financial Policies”.
This  perception  is  understandable  given  potential  benefits  from  diminishing  the  information
asymmetry between the monetary authority and the public at large. First, the central bank gains
opportunity  to  match  its  actions  to  its  public  statements,  which  is  an  effective  venue  for
strengthening credibility (IMF, 1999). Second, transparency helps align private sector expectations
with the official forecasts of inflation and other monetary variables, which reduces their volatility
and  makes  a  country’s  monetary  conditions  less  risky  (Favero  et  al.,  2000).    Third,  a  higher
degree  of  transparency  reinforces  the  expectations  channel  of  monetary  policy  transmission
relative to alternative channels such as the aggregate demand, the exchange rate, etc. (Svensson,
1999).  In the context of our research, this gain is particularly important, since the expectations
channel plays a pivotal role in the DIT policy framework, thus transparency can be viewed as an
important  prerequisite  for  a  viable  introduction  of  the  DIT  (Mishkin,  2000),  particularly  by  the
monetary authorities in the transition economies (Orlowski, 2000, 2001).
There  are  two  basic  approaches  to  measuring  monetary  policy  transparency:  (1)  the
institutional  approach  evaluates  the  extent  of  information  disclosed  by  central  banks  through
available documents (Eijffinger and Geraats, 2002) and (2) the behavioural approach takes into
consideration  the  clarity  among  financial  market  participants  about  the  actual  course  of  the
monetary  policy  and  can  be  assessed  by  measuring  the  impact  of  policy  announcements  on
market interest rates (Haldane and Read, 2000). We conduct our analysis along both approaches.
This  allows  us  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  central  banks  can  improve  behavioural
transparency  and  therefore  effectiveness  of  monetary  policy  by  simply  changing  patterns  of
information disclosure. 
                Studies & Analyses No. 281 – Monetary Policy Transparency in the Inflation ...
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2.1. Institutional Transparency: the Eijffinger-Geraats Model
Eijffinger and Geraats (2002) perceive transparency as a multifaceted concept that comprises
political, economic, procedural, policy and operational aspects of central banking
1. These aspects
can be illustrated in relation to the simple model of the economy:
()
2 2 *) ( y k y A L − + − = π π  ( 1 )
( ) d r i a y y
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Equation (1) is the central bank loss function,  * π   is the  inflation  target,  y k   is the  output
target,  y  is the potential level of output, k>1 represents the political pressure at high levels of
output
2, and A is the relative weight attached to output stabilisation, that determines the willingness
of  central  bank  to  allow  deviations  from  inflationary  targets  (Cukierman,  2001b).  Equation  (2)
characterises the aggregate demand where i is nominal interest rate,  r  is long-term interest rate
and d is aggregate demand shock. Equation (3) is a new-Keynesian Phillips curve with the slope
determined by b and supply shock represented as s. Equation (4) represents reaction function of
the central bank that generally should be consistent with its loss function and the structure of the
economy, while e denotes financial shocks leading to the imperfect control of central bank over i.
Given this set-up, political transparency implies openness about policy objectives, including an
explicit  prioritisation  of  potentially  conflicting  goals  and  quantitative  targets  or  in  other  words
openness  about  parameters  of  equation  (1). This  could  be  beneficial  as formal  objectives  and
quantitative targets might diminish the uncertainty about policymakers’ preferences and therefore
reduce  inflationary  bias,  as  shown  by  Nolan  and  Schaling  (1996).  Also  IMF  (1999)  underlines
importance of matching policymakers actions to public statements in order to enhance reputation.
Last but not least, institutional arrangements and central bank independence in particular play a
crucial  role  in  the  evaluation  of  political  transparency  as  they  might  be  critical  for  preventing
deviations from stated objectives. The evidence of the importance of independence for credibility of
monetary policy and price stability is documented, among many others, by Cukierman (1996).
                                                          
1 A similar approach is presented by De Haan et.al. (2001), although it is less comprehensive and based on arbitrary
weighting of responses. Bernanke et al. (1999) evaluate transparency of selected countries in detail and Blinder et al.
(2001) offer informal discussion of transparency of major central banks. These studies do not provide common criteria for
measuring and comparing transparency across countries. Fry et al. (2000) construct an index of ‘policy explanations’ for
91 central banks; however, since it is constructed on the basis of central banks survey, it may lead to biased results.
Finally, there are number of studies that measure transparency along one selected dimension, for example, Chortareas
et al. (2001) focus exclusively on the degree of detail of published forecasts in their survey of 87 countries.
2 This can be attributed to the political cycles driven by elections (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989) that can create pressure
on the government to support targeting output above the natural rate (Alesina, 1988).Studies & Analyses No. 281 M. Jarmużek, L.T. Orłowski, A. Radziwiłł                                                       
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Economic transparency relates to economic information underlying monetary policy including
the available economic data, employed policy models and the internal forecasts that the central
bank relies on. In other words it involves the symmetric information about both economic variables
and  structural  parameters  in  equations  (2)  and  (3).  According  to  Tarkka  and  Mayes  (1999)
monetary policy is more predictable due to release of central bank forecast. Furthermore, Geraats
(2000) shows that the publication of comprehensive central bank forecasts or its economic model
facilitates  reputation  building  while  at  the  same  time  allowing  for  greater  flexibility  to  stabilise
economic  shocks.  Geraats  (2001)  argues  that  “Only  perfect  transparency  about  economic
information completely eliminates the inflation bias”. Chortareas et al. (2002) find that the greater
degree of detail in the central banks’ published forecasts is associated with lower average inflation.
In  a  different  vein,  Gersbach  (1998)  and  Cukierman  (2001a)  find  that  greater  economic
transparency has a negative impact on stabilisation effectiveness in the absence of preference
uncertainty. Geraats (2002b) also argues that economic transparency might lead to greater political
pressure on central bank when its independence is not well established.
Procedural transparency denotes openness of decision making process and it might involve
policy rule or strategy and also release of minutes and voting records that show the considerations
underpinning  the  decisions.  In  other  words,  it  involves  openness  about  the  functional  form  of
equation (4).  Buiter (1999) and Gersbach and Hahn (2001a, 2001b,) seem to suggest the positive
consequences  of  disclosure  of  non-attributed  voting  records  and  minutes,  while  there  is  still
controversy about the release of attributed documents.
Policy transparency involves prompt announcement and adequate explanation of the decision
as well as policy inclination to signal possible future actions, i.e. availability of information about i in
equation (2).  Tabellini (1987), Dotsey (1987), Rudin (1988), Cosimano and Van Huyck (1993)
show that secrecy about short-term monetary targets might either facilitate or impede achievement
of  monetary  objectives  depending  on  the  knowledge  of  the  longer-term  target  and  the
sophistication  in  the  exchange  of  information  between  central  bank  and  private  agents.
Furthermore, neither the importance of policy explanation nor indication has been unambiguously
evaluated in the literature.
Operational  transparency  characterises  control  errors  in  implementation  of  monetary  policy
and disturbances that affect the transmission of monetary policy or the symmetry in knowledge
about shocks s, d and e in equations (2), (3) and (4), respectively. Faust and Svensson (2002)
argue that operational transparency tends to reduce the inflation bias and improve social welfare;
however they also show (Faust and Svensson, 2001) that operational transparency is likely to be
quite limited in practice. Jensen (2001) argues that although high operational transparency might
alleviate the low credibility problem, it may also limit central bank ability to stabilise output. 
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Eijffinger and Geraats (2002) provide the questionnaire that allows compiling the index that
captures  all  five  distinctive  categories  of  transparency  discussed  above.  This  questionnaire  is
utilised in the empirical part of this study and will be discussed further in Section 3.
2.2. Behavioural Transparency: the Haldane-Read Model
Haldane and Read (2000) propose a simple theoretical framework underlining the behavioural
measure of transparency. This framework is based on the model of monetary policy surprises that










m t t x x i − = + δ  ( 6 )
( ) 1 / 1 − + + + + + + − = t j m t j t
c
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Equation (5) describes the monetary policy transmission mechanism, in which xt stands for a
vector  of  variables  that  are  embedded  in  a  central  bank’s  reaction  function
4,  k  is  the  average




m t ti +  is the central bank’s official interest rate at time  t with maturity m. Some information
asymmetry is assumed, as εt+1 (i≥0) is known only to the monetary authorities at the time preceding
decision-making on interest rates. Equation (6) can be perceived as a policy feedback rule that
specifies  coefficient δ reflecting discrepancies between the vector of feedback variables and the
vector of policy targets.
6 Future policy targets xt+i
* (i≥0) that are not known to the private sector
agents create another source of information asymmetry. The private sector determines the yield
curve reflecting a predicted path of future official interest rates based on the expectations theory of
the term structure that is included in equation (7).
The  economic  rationale  behind  this  model  is  that  the  central  bank  uses  equation  (5)
embedding monetary transmission mechanism to infer xt when a shock εt occurs at the beginning
of each period (t-1). Subsequently, the central bank sets future policy targets xt
*. Since this part of
the  process  cannot  be  observed  by  the  private  sector,  predictions  regarding  a  path  of  official
interest rates are based on its own judgements of the current and expected values of xt and xt
*
included in equations (5) and (6). The information about these expectations can be extracted from
the yield curve by analysing the forward rates. If a shift in the forward rates occurs following the
                                                          
3 Equation (5) can be interpreted as a reduced form of equations (2) and (3); equation (6) restates (4).
4 These variables can be inflation, output, or employment (Svensson, 1997).
5 Haldane and Read (2000) assume that β is known for both the central bank and private sector.
6 It is assumed that both the central bank and the private sector know a parameter δ.Studies & Analyses No. 281 M. Jarmużek, L.T. Orłowski, A. Radziwiłł                                                       
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decision  announcement  about  official  interest  rates  at  time  t  relative  to  t-1  in  which  the
expectations were formed, the sets of feedback variables xt and policy targets xt
*  for the central
bank and the private sector were different. This can be interpreted as the lack of transparency that
can  impair  credibility  of  monetary  authorities  because  they  were  not  able  to  provide  sufficient
information about their reaction function and to convince the agents about their commitment to
achieving the policy goals. Based on this argument, the econometric analysis of market interest
rates responses to changes in official interest rates may provide a useful behavioural measure of
transparency. Such analysis is conducted in the empirical section of this paper.
3. Institutional Measure of Transparency
3.1. Eijffinger and Geraats Index for NMS
In this section we follow the methodology of Eijffinger and Geraats (2002) in order to compile
the transparency index for the central banks in the three NMS countries that have adopted DIT
strategy. As mentioned above, the EG index captures five distinctive categories of transparency:
political, economic, procedural, policy and operational for three central banks in the EU accession.
We derive answers to each survey question developed by EG (Appendix 1) from the information
published by central banks in NMS and, subsequently, we obtain the set of indices characterising
each transparency type. The answers are assigned a score ranging from zero to one. The results
of  our  evaluation  are  presented  in Table  1. They  are  compared  to  the  ECB  benchmark  score
replicated from EG. 
                Studies & Analyses No. 281 – Monetary Policy Transparency in the Inflation ...
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Table 1. EG index for DIT central banks versus ECB
Transparency Criterion CNB NBH NBP ECB
P o l i t i c a l 3333
a .   F o r m a l   O b j e c t i v e s 1111
b. Quantitative Targets 1111
c. Institutional Arrangements 1111
Economic 2,5 3 0,5 2,5
a. Economic Data 0,5 1 0,5 1
b .   P o l i c y   M o d e l s 1101
c. Central Bank Forecasts 1 1 0 0,5
P r o c e d u r a l 2121
a .   E x p l i c i t   S t r a t e g y 1111
b .   M i n u t e s 1000
c .   V o t i n g   R e c o r d s 0010
Policy 2 1 3 1,5
a. Prompt Announcement 1111
b. Policy Explanation 1 0 1 0,5
c .   P o l i c y   I n c l i n a t i o n 0010
Operational 2,5 3 2,5 2
a .   C o n t r o l   E r r o r s 1111
b.Transmission Disturbances 0,5 1 0,5 0,5
c. Evaluation Policy Outcome 1 1 1 0,5
T o t a l 1 21 11 11 0
Source: Own evaluation based on documents available at official web sites of NMS central banks. The ECB score is
replicated from Eiffinger and Geraats (2002).
In  evaluating  political  transparency  we  inquire  about  the  existence  of  formal  objectives,
quantitative  target  and  independence  (Appendix  1,  Question  1).  All  three  central  banks  in  our
sample have formal objectives for monetary policy; price stability is the main policy objective within
the  DIT  strategy.  The  quantitative  target  for  the  price  stability  is  also  explicitly  specified  in  all
examined NMS. Finally, all of them have a guaranteed institutional independence of central bank
from the government, mostly in the form of explicit instrument independence. In the case of Poland
this independence is  stated  in  the  constitution  and  a  similar  law  is  being  written  in  the  Czech
Republic in an effort to bring compliance with the EU law
7. In sum, all examined central banks are
awarded the maximum score on political transparency, which is in line with the ECB benchmark
score.
In evaluating economic transparency of the surveyed central banks, we focus on three criteria:
disclosure of economic data, policy models and official forecasts (Appendix 1, Question 2). To
assess the timely release of economic data, EG questionnaire looks at the disclosure practice of
money supply, inflation, GDP, unemployment rate and capacity utilisation data
8. These data, with
                                                          
7 Formal guarantees of central bank independence in NMS are in fact a reflection of the historically strong political
pressures.
8 Following the discussion of major factors affecting monetary policy action outlined in central bank documents one might
argue that some indicators of the fiscal policy stance along with the external imbalance and exchange rate misalignment
could be also considered under this category.  In fact, the general government balance and the current account data areStudies & Analyses No. 281 M. Jarmużek, L.T. Orłowski, A. Radziwiłł                                                       
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the exception of capacity utilisation, are published in every country on at least quarterly basis,
either by a central bank or a national statistical office. Estimation of capacity utilisation poses a
methodological challenge for countries undertaking major structural change and it is available only
for Hungary that receives a full score for this criterion, while the two other NMS receive a reduced
score. The second criterion is based on the assumption that in order to interpret the central bank’s
policy actions it is important to know the policy models it employs. Among the three NMS, only the
National Bank of Poland (NBP) is yet to publicly disclose a model underlying its policy analysis.
Furthermore, NBP does not release numerical internal forecasts for inflation and/or output. Since
the  Czech  National  Bank  (CNB)  and  the  National  Bank  of  Hungary  (NBH)  publish  quarterly
forecasts, they receive a full score. In sum, only Poland seems to lag behind the ECB in economic
transparency.
To measure procedural transparency, we look for central banks description of monetary policy
strategy, the publication of minutes and voting records (Appendix 1, Question 3).  All central banks
in our sample pursue an explicit monetary policy strategy, namely the DIT framework. With respect
to the minutes, the CNB is the only DIT central bank that releases a comprehensive account of
policy deliberations within a reasonable amount of time. However, minutes are not detailed and
they are non-attributed. Neither the NBH nor the NBP publishes the minutes, although both banks
release policy announcement following monthly  meetings  of their governing  councils. The  third
criterion is based on the assumption that monetary authority should also release voting records
that would disclose how each decision on its main operating instrument or target was reached. The
NBP is the only central bank that publishes attributed voting records. The CNB discloses non-
attributed voting records and therefore it scores a half point, while the NBH does not disclose
voting records and receives a zero score. In summary, in the category of procedural transparency
the NBH is at par with the benchmark score of the ECB that provides neither minutes, nor voting
records, while the NBP and the CNB seem to outperform it.
Policy transparency entails timely disclosure of policy decisions, its explanation and the future
bias (Appendix 1, Question 4). In terms of a prompt announcement of monetary policy decisions,
all central banks receive a full score. Two of them publish a policy explanation, although in different
forms. The CNB includes the statement of policy decision in its minutes, while the NBP provides
explanation in the press release following each meeting of the Monetary Policy Council. Only the
NBH does not provide policy explanation and therefore receives a zero score. The publication of
policy inclination is not a common practise among the examined central banks, with the exception
of the NBP that announces a policy bias, and thus scores a full point. To sum up, in terms of policy
transparency the NBP emerges as a leader with a maximum score, followed by the CNB. Both
outperform the ECB, which does not provide any policy inclinations and publishes solely a vague
policy explanation. Hungary lags behind the two other NMS and the ECB.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
available in each of the examined NMS, at least on a quarterly basis. In addition, the inclusion of other factors such as
labour productivity, real wages and unit labour cost could further enhance transparency. 
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Operational  Transparency  encompasses  control  errors,  transmission  disturbances  and
evaluation of policy outcome (Appendix 1, Question 5).  Control errors pertain to the degree of
achieving the policy operating targets. All central banks provide such evaluation on at least annual
basis  and  get  a  full  score.  The  second  criterion  inquires  whether  the  central  bank  regularly
provides  information  on  unanticipated  macroeconomic  disturbances  that  affect  the  policy
transmission  process.  In  other  words,  it  tells  us  whether  or  not  the  central  bank  includes  a
discussion of past forecast errors. Only the NBH includes such discussion, while the CNB and the
NBP  provide  only  general  assessment  of  developments  in  monetary  policy  transmission
mechanism and score half point. The next issue is whether the central bank provides regularly an
evaluation of the policy outcome relative to its macroeconomic objectives. In this respect all central
banks obtain a full score, although their analyses do not appear equally thorough. In summary, all
examined central banks seem to be more transparent in evaluating their policy performance than
the ECB. This underpins their credibility-building efforts, even though their analyses and policy
explanations are often vague - the factor that is not captured by the EG index.
As  shown  in  Table  1,  the  overall  score  does  not  fully  reflect  the  pronounced  specific
differences in transparency criteria for the individual NMS. Moreover, the results imply that the
institutional transparency achieved by all NMS is impressively high and not inferior to that of the
ECB. In the following sections we will discuss why such a favourable assessment might be partly
misleading, as it does not translate into high behavioural transparency.
3.2. DIT Extension of Eijffinger and Geraats Index for NMS
In this section we dwell further on the qualitative aspects of institutional transparency in the
three DIT countries. The EG index does not capture adequately specific features of this policy
framework,  and,  as  examined  in  the  literature,  the  DIT  conditions  are  highly  diversified  in  the
individual NMS (Orlowski, 2003). We, therefore, evaluate the monetary regimes in NMS against
the  DIT  blueprint  that  contains  a  unique,  forward-looking  inflation  target,  specified  as  a  linear
trajectory  with  a  continuous  target  monitoring  and  adjustment  on  a  rolling  basis,  and  well-
prescribed  reaction  rules  on  missing  the  target  (Svensson,  1999;  Orlowski,  2001;  Jonas  and
Mishkin, 2003). Consistently, we supplement the original EG questionnaire with the DIT-specific
questions about a number of policy goals, exchange rate policy, forward-looking character, target
specification, trajectory, monitoring, adjustment rules and overshooting procedures. Our extended
questionnaire is applied to the three NMS as well as to the ECB, answers to each question are
evaluated on the scale zero to one and the results are reported in Table 2. The results for NMS are
benchmarked against the ECB score in our analysis.Studies & Analyses No. 281 M. Jarmużek, L.T. Orłowski, A. Radziwiłł                                                       
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Table 2. Extending EG index: Transparency under DIT
CNB NBH NBP ECB
Unique goal 1011
Exchange rate policy 0.5 0 1 0.5
Forward/backward 1101
CPI or core inflation 1111
Trajectory 10 . 51 1
Quarterly rolling basis 1001
Target change 0.5 0.5 0 0.5
Missing the target 0.5 0 0 0
Total 6.5 3 4 6
Source: Own evaluation based on documents available at official web sites of NMS central banks and the ECB.
The first criterion contains a fundamental question whether the inflation target constitutes the
unique goal of monetary policy. The CNB and the NBP receive a full point, as they do not specify
other explicit goals beyond the one stated in the DIT strategy. On the contrary, the NBH is still
targeting the exchange rate band in addition to the inflation target thus it scores zero. The ECB
receives a full point since it follows a clearly predetermined inflation target of maximum two percent
inflation based on the harmonised CPI.
Large-scale interventions in the foreign exchange market conducted within active exchange
rate  policy  constitute  potential  sources  of  non-transparency  in  the  implementation  of  the  DIT
strategy. The NBP is the only examined bank that does not intervene in the foreign exchange
market and thus receives a full score. The CNB that has engaged only in small-scale interventions
receives a half-point, while the NBH receives no point for its heavy interventions. While the ECB
intervenes infrequently and on a relatively small scale, it scores a half point.
 Next, we evaluate the conformity of policy rule with DIT strategy. According to Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999), inflation forecast targeting requires the policy instrument to be adjusted in such a
way that a conditional inflation forecast (the intermediate target variable) hits the inflation target at
an appropriate level. The ECB emphasises the forward-looking character of conducted policies, but
only the NBH and the CNB formulate their monetary policy based on such a forward-looking rule,
which also implies publishing the inflation forecasts. Both central banks publish a discussion about
the  outlook  for  the  main  determinants  of  inflation,  taking  into  consideration  the  upside  and
downside risks of missing the target. Consequently, they receive a full score. The NBP does not
release forecasts, and thus it does not conform to the forward-looking policy rule.
The next question deals with the choice of the inflation target. Core inflation has in principle the
advantage of greater stability and smaller vulnerability to shocks. Using core inflation will reduce
the danger of missing the target due to price volatility that is outside the scope of monetary policy.
However, there are also substantial drawbacks of adopting core inflation as a target, as it does not 
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encompass adjustments in administratively regulated prices. Also, core inflation indexes have not
proved to be more stable than the headline index in transition countries (Jonas and Mishkin, 2003).
The main argument in favouring CPI over core inflation as a policy target is that the private sector
customarily uses it as a basis for forming inflation expectations. The ECB and all analysed central
banks specify their policy target on the basis of the headline CPI
9.  In addition, all banks employ
various measures of core inflation to the price changes that they can influence. The CNB used to
employ net inflation as its main analytical and communicative indicator of inflation; however it has
switched to targeting headline inflation since April 2001.  All central banks receive a full score.
The following  criterion  is  based  on  the  assumption that  the  inflation  targeting  central  bank
should announce target trajectory. Only CNB and NBP release information about pursuing inflation
target trajectory for  the  medium-term.  They  apply  the  target  trajectory  for  headline  inflation  by
means of a continuous band. We assign a half point to NBH that  provides operating year-end
targets for the next two years, as well as the ultimate target of 3 percent to be met by 2005 instead
of a continuous band.
The  next  criterion  informs  us  whether  a  central  bank  employs  a  rolling  basis  for  quarterly
assessment of target fulfilment. The two central banks that meet this standard are the CNB and the
NBP, as indicated in their Inflation Reports. The NBH receives no point, since it follows the year-
end targets only, in spite of publishing a target trajectory for the medium- term. We note that the
practice of the ECB is to provide such assessment monthly.
We assign a half point to the CNB and NBH for an ex post target change of the inflation target.
Neither of these countries explicitly excludes a possibility of a target change but such action has
never taken place since the introduction of DIT.  The same assessment applies to the ECB. The
NBP has an inclination to change the inflation target when meeting it becomes problematic (as in
1999 and in 2002) and therefore receives no point.
Achieving the inflation target is the main factor determining the decision-making process with
respect to changes in monetary policy instrument at any stage. Nonetheless, it should be taken
into account that in reality a number of exogenous shocks or unforeseen events can occur whose
causes remain fully or predominantly outside of monetary policy control. Accordingly, it would be
economically  irrational  and  costly  for  monetary  policy  to  attempt  to  correct  or  eliminate  the
consequences of such shocks on a short-term basis. Thus, it is extremely important for monetary
authorities  pursuing  DIT  strategy  to  work  out  target  overshooting  procedures.  Only  the  CNB
obtains a half point for releasing precisely defined escape clauses. Such clause is also missing in
the case of the ECB.
In contrast to the index constructed on the basis of EG, this extended evaluation shows that
there are marked differences in institutional transparency among the three central banks. The CNB
policy appears to be the most transparent as it is the only NMS central bank that outscores the
                                                          
9 More precisely, the ECB inflation target is based on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area.Studies & Analyses No. 281 M. Jarmużek, L.T. Orłowski, A. Radziwiłł                                                       
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ECB. The overall scores of NBH and NBP lag behind. It shall be noted, however that the NBP
scores relatively better on questions related to the exclusivity of inflationary goal, while the NBH on
the forward-looking character of the policy.
4. Behavioural Measures of Transparency: Empirical Results
In this section we test whether the monetary policy in the three NMS that have adopted DIT is
transparent  based  on  the  observed  dynamics  of  financial  markets.  Under  a  transparent  policy
financial  market  participants  have  clarity  about  the  true  course  of  the  monetary  policy,
consequently  market  interest  rates  closely  follow  the  official  rates.  We  also  ask  whether  the
introduction of DIT strategy actually increased such defined behavioural transparency. In order to
address these issues we estimate how short-term money market interest rates react to changes in
official interest rates. This methodology follows Haldane and Read (2000) who argue that in a
transparent monetary policy regime, short-term interest rates anticipate to some extent changes in
official  rates. The  argument  relies  on  information  asymmetry  and  the  existence  of  a  stationary
stochastic  equilibrium  with  full  knowledge  of  the  authorities’  reaction  function
10.    The  original
econometric model proposed by Haldane and Reed (2000) is as follows:
() j m t
c
m t t j j
c
m t t j j m t j t j j j m t j t e i D i i L i + + + + + + + + + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ δ γ β α (8)
for j=1,3,6,24,60,120,240, where j stands for maturity of the forward rate expressed in months
and t is a time index. It assumed that m=1, as the main instrument, usually affects monthly money
market rate. β(L) is a vector of polynomial lag operator (L). The lagged dependent variables are
used to remove autocorrelation, whereas D is a regime-shift dummy variable aimed at capturing an
introduction of DIT strategy. Both variables are specified in first differences in order to examine
contemporaneous movements in interest rates. We modify the original specification because the
markets  for  forward  interest  rates  are  underdeveloped  in  NMS.  Thus  the  specification  that  is
employed  in  the  model  excludes  forward  interest  rates  and  embeds  short-term  money  market





t j j t j j t i D i i L i ε δ γ β α + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ , , (9)
Our econometric analysis is based upon the data on official interest rates downloaded from the
CNB,  the  NBH,  and  the  NBP  web  sites  as  well  as  the  data  on  money  market  interest  rates
                                                          
10 The original idea of Haldane and Read (2000) is “to extract measures of interest rate surprises along the yield curve”.
Therefore, the authors also examine whether the monetary policy is credible by looking at the long-end of the yield curve.
This approach is however not feasible in the case of analysed NMS, as they had to bring inflation down (which has
shifted their yield curves significantly over the last decade) and as they lack developed forward rates market. These
factors could lead to misleading results in evaluation of credibility, but are not essential in the valuation of transparency
that is the focus of this research. 
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obtained from the Reuters Database and the EcoWin Database.
11 The time series that are used in
the estimations are sampled daily and cover the period of January 1, 1996 to July 21, 2003 for the
Czech Republic, December 25, 1996 to May 23, 2003 for Hungary, and March 2, 1998 to May 23,
2003 for Poland. The graphical presentation of the data series for the three NMS and the ECB is
shown in Figures 1-4.








1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
REF PRI B1 M PRI B3 M
Note: The main instrument of the CNB monetary policy is a two-week repo rate through which it affects the money
market rates, i.e. 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month PRIBOR (Prague Interbank Offering Rate).







1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
REF BUD1 M BUD3M
Note: The main instrument of the NBH monetary policy is a two-week refinancing rate through which it affects its
money market rates, i.e. 1-month and 3-month BUBOR (Budapest Interbank Offering Rate).
Source: EcoWin, Reuters, and MNB
                                                          
11 The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge helpful comments on the data and financial markets developments in
NMS received from Rafal Benecki of the Bank Millennium and Radomir Jac of the Commerzbank Securities.Studies & Analyses No. 281 M. Jarmużek, L.T. Orłowski, A. Radziwiłł                                                       
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
REF WI B 1 M WI B 3 M
Note: The main instrument of the NBP monetary policy is two-week reference rate (money market intervention rate)
through which it affects its money market rates, i.e. 1-month and 3-month WIBOR (Warsaw Interbank Offering
Rate).
Source: EcoWin, Reuters, and NBP









1999 2000 2001 2002
REF EUR1M EUR3M
Note: The main instrument of the ECB monetary policy is a one-week refinancing rate through which it affects its money
market rates, i.e. 1-month and 3-month EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offering Rate).
Source: EcoWin, Reuters, and ECB
The econometric estimation of the Equation (9) at the short-end of the yield curve
12 provides
the evidence of a substantial improvement in transparency of monetary policy conducted by the
CNB and the NBP (Table 3). The coefficients for the variables measuring reaction to changes in
the official repo rate are statistically significant and their magnitudes are smaller during the DIT
                                                          
12 Detailed results are provided in the annex. 
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period.  This  improvement  confirms  expectations  about  positive  results  of  enhancement  in
communication strategy and quality of analytical publications since the introduction of the DIT that
seemingly allowed for more clarity about central banks reaction functions among financial market
participants. Based on lower values of estimated coefficients γ and δ for Poland one can draw a
conclusion that the NBP is more transparent than the CNB. This is somewhat puzzling given the
higher CNB scores on institutional transparency. However, the most transparent is the ECB, due to
its parameter γ slightly lower than that of the NBP. Most intriguing are results for Hungary. The
empirical evidence suggests a marked decline in the NBH transparency following the introduction
of DIT.  The NBH transparency is significantly lower than that of NBP or CNB, while under the
exchange rate peg it seemed to be very transparent. The noted deterioration in NBH behavioural
transparency has taken place in spite of the improvement in information disclosure over the last
three years. One may therefore argue that the policies of CNB and, in particular, the NBH that are
based on active exchange rate management tend to deteriorate the behavioural transparency.
Table 3.  Empirical results
    Czech Republic Hungary Poland ECB
γ 0.4740 0.5667 0.3199 0.2718
δ1 0.5311 -0.5478 0.2471 1m
δ2 -0.5493   -0.3831  
γ 0.3136 0.5500 0.1848 0.2064
δ1 0.8336 -0.5346 0.2054 3m
δ2 -0.2116   -0.1528  
Source: own estimations
5. The Link Between Institutional and Behavioural Transparency
The behavioural measure of transparency suggests that Poland has the most and Hungary the
least  transparent  monetary  policy.  These  results  are  not  fully  consistent  with  the  institutional
measure based on EG index, by which CNB appears to be more transparent than its counterparts.
The  CNB  leadership  seems  to  be  confirmed  by  evaluation  based  on  the  extended  EG  index
incorporating specific features of the DIT strategy. Based on this extended analysis, the CNB again
emerges as the most transparent central bank although this is not confirmed by the behavioural
measure.
Looking  at  individual  categories  of  institutional  transparency,  the  scores  are  more
differentiated.  The  score  for  the  economic  transparency  is  inconsistent  with  the  behavioural
measure; it therefore seems ambiguous whether the publication of the model, capacity utilisationStudies & Analyses No. 281 M. Jarmużek, L.T. Orłowski, A. Radziwiłł                                                       
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and even internal forecasts has a significant impact on the behavioural transparency. Moreover,
while we strongly believe that the political aspect of transparency, in particular the central bank
independence is essential, there is not enough variation in scores among the examined NMS to
draw a conclusion about its link to the behavioural transparency. On the other hand, the policy
transparency corresponds very well to the ranking of the behavioural measure. This suggests that
the policy explanation and the statement of policy inclination may have strongly correlated with the
behavioural transparency.
Taking into consideration the extended EG index, the institutional transparency seems to be
correlated with the behavioural transparency in terms of the single policy goal and the absence of
active  exchange  rate  policy.  Poland  is  leading  on  both  counts.  The  two  other  NMS  may  be
suffering from the “fear of floating” that poses a constraint on their policy conduct within the DIT
framework. This might be explained by their high degree of openness relative to Poland. As a
result,  their  frequent  resorting  to  foreign  exchange  market  interventions  misleads  the  financial
markets and thus inhibits the behavioural transparency. Although the NBP lags behind on some
important aspects of DIT – in particular the backward- rather than forward-looking policy rule and
the  lack  of  published  inflation  forecasts,  these  weaknesses  are  more  than  offset  by  its  firm
commitment to the inflation goal and refraining from foreign exchange interventions
13.
In our opinion, it is therefore exactly the uniqueness of goal and absence of active exchange
rate  policy  that  crucial  in  determining  the  behavioural  transparency.  However,  the  analysis  of
Hungary also suggests that targeting the exchange rate translate into a more transparent monetary
policy than targeting inflation when exchange rate policy is not truly abandoned. This finding is
potentially important for preparations for accession to the EMU and the preceding participation in
the ERM2 as the exchange rate target needs to be given more consideration. This, in turn, may
potentially hinder the monetary policy transparency in NMS.
6. Concluding Remarks
Our  general  finding  is  that  the  monetary  authorities  of  Poland,  Hungary  and  the  Czech
Republic have advanced their monetary policy transparency to the level roughly comparable to that
of the ECB.  Since transparency improvement can be viewed as an effective venue of enhancing
monetary policy credibility, we feel entitled to argue that the NMS central banks are ripe to join the
European System of Central Banks as its fully credible members. The demonstrated degree of
alignment  of  monetary  policy  transparency  between  the  three  NMS  and  the  ECB  can  be  also
interpreted as a progress on the road to the EMU.
Nevertheless,  our  examination  of  the  three  central  banks  by  the  individual  criteria  of
institutional transparency identifies a number of deficiencies that they still need to overcome, in
                                                          
13 This is consistent with the assessment of the success in DIT implementation by Jonas and Mishkin (2003). 
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spite  of  their  overall  success.  Specifically,  the  NBP  may  improve  transparency  by  increasing
reliance of its policy decisions on inflation forecasts and other forward-looking variables, as well as
by a public disclosure of its underlying policy model and the official inflation forecast. Both the CNB
and the NBP could expand the range of economic data made available for public information. At
minimum,  the  NBH  needs  to  improve  its  procedural  transparency  with  respect  to  a  public
disclosure  of  minutes  and  voting  records  of  the  governing  council  meetings.  Perhaps  more
importantly,  the  NBH  could  become  more transparent  if  it  provided  a  clear  prioritisation  of  the
inflation target over the exchange rate stability goal.  In sum, by the institutional definition, the CNB
appears to be the most transparent among the examined central banks, even outperforming the
ECB. On the behavioural transparency grounds, the NBP emerges as a clear leader.  This is a
noteworthy accomplishment since it implies an important venue for strengthening credibility and
promoting the role of expectation channel in the conduct of monetary policy.
Without doubt, the adoption of DIT strategies by the three  examined  central  banks  has
contributed  to  a  significant  improvement  in  monetary  policy  transparency.  This  improvement  is
documented by our examination of the behavioural transparency.  But in the near future, these
NMS will be obliged to join the ERM II on their way to a full adoption of the euro.  By doing so, they
will have to supplement their predominant inflation target by the exchange rate stability target.  It
remains to be seen whether such a dual-targeting strategy will dilute their commitment to price
stability and, therefore, hinder their monetary policy transparency. In response to such fears, new
means of fostering transparency will have to be explored and devised for such a complex, dual-
targeting  policy  framework  stemming  from  the  necessity  to  fulfill  the  Maastricht  convergence
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Appendix 1: Eijffinger and Geraats Index Questionnaire
The central bank transparency index is the sum of the scores for the answers to all questions
below (min = 0, max = 15). All questions pertain to published information that is freely available in
English.
1.  Political Transparency
Political  transparency  refers  to  openness  about  policy  objectives.    It  comprises  a  formal
statement  of  objectives,  including  an  explicit  prioritisation  in  case  of  multiple  goals,  a
quantification of the primary objective(s) and explicit institutional arrangements.
(a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit prioritisation
in case of multiple objectives?
No formal objective(s) = 0.
Multiple objectives without prioritisation = 1/2.
One objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1.
(b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
(c) Are there explicit institutional arrangements or contracts between the
monetary authorities and the government?
No central bank, contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0.
Central bank without explicit instrument, independence or contract =1/2.
Central bank with explicit instrument, independence or contract (although possibly subject to an
explicit override procedure) =1.
2.  Economic Transparency
Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for monetary policy.
This  includes  economic  data,  the  model  of  the  economy  that  the  central  bank  employs  to
construct forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the internal forecasts (model
based or judgmental) that the central bank relies on.
(a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly available? The
focus is on the following five variables: money supply, inflation, GDP, unemployment rate and
capacity utilisation.
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables = 0.
Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables = 1/2.
Quarterly time series for all five variables = 1.
(b) Does the central bank disclose the formal macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy analysis?
No = 0.
Yes = 1. 
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(c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts?
No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output = 0.
Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than quarterly
frequency = 1/2.
Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the medium term (one to
two  years  ahead),  specifying  the  assumptions  about  the  policy  instrument  (conditional  or
unconditional forecasts) =1.
3.  Procedural Transparency
Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. It involves an
explicit  monetary  policy  rule  or  strategy  that  describes  the  monetary  policy  framework,  an
account of policy deliberations and how the policy decision was reached.




(b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or explanations in
case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time?
No, or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0.
Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or explanations
(in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward- and forward-looking
arguments = 1.
(c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating instrument
or target was reached?
No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks)=0.
Non-attributed voting records = 1/2.
Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1.
4.  Policy Transparency
Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy decisions. In addition, it includes an
explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy inclination or indication of likely future policy
actions.
(a)  Are  decisions  about  adjustments  to  the  main  operating  instrument  or  target  promptly
announced?
No, or after a significant lag = 0.
Yes, at the latest on the day of implementation = 1.
(b)  Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions?
No = 0.
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially = 1/2.Studies & Analyses No. 281 M. Jarmużek, L.T. Orłowski, A. Radziwiłł                                                       
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Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments = 1.
(c)  Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy meeting or an
explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
5.  Operational Transparency
Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank’s policy actions. It
involves  a  discussion  of  control  errors  in  achieving  operating  targets  and  (unanticipated)
macroeconomic disturbances that affect the transmission of monetary policy. Furthermore, the
evaluation  of  the  macroeconomic  outcomes  of  monetary  policy  in  light  of  its  objectives  is
included here as well.
(a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating targets (if any)
have been achieved?
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.
Yes, but without providing explanations for significant deviations =1/2.
Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly) perfect control over
main operating instrument/target = 1.
(b) Does  the  central  bank  regularly  provide  information  on  (unanticipated)  macroeconomic
disturbances that affect the policy transmission process?
No, or not very often = 0.
Yes, but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic developments
(at least quarterly) = 1/2.
Yes, including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually) =1.
(c) Does  the  central  bank  regularly  provide  an  evaluation  of  the  policy  outcome  in  light  of  its
macroeconomic objectives?
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.
Yes, but without providing explanations for deviations = 1/2.
Yes, with an explicit account for deviations between policy outcomes and objectives = 1.
Appendix 2: Questionnaire Extending EG Index for DIT Countries
1.  Is inflation rate target the only goal of monetary policy?
No = 0
Yes=1
2.  Is central bank conducting an active exchange rate policy?
There is exchange rate target or there were major foreign exchange interventions since the
introduction of the DIT  = 0 
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There is an exchange rate target or there were limited size interventions since the introduction
of the DIT  = 0.5
No = 1
3.  Is policy rule consistent with forward-looking character of the DIT strategy?
Yes, policy is forward-looking and based on inflation forecasts =1
No, policy is backward looking=0
4.  What is policy target?
Core inflation = 0
CPI=1
5.  Is trajectory of the target provided?
Only one, short or medium, term targets is specified = 0
There are combined short and medium term targets=0.5
Yes, full target trajectory for the medium term (up to 3 years)=1
6.  Is meeting the target assessed on the rolling basis at least quarterly?
No= 0
Yes=1
7.  What is the probability of ex-post target change?
Not explicitly excluded and the target has been modified ex-post since the introduction of the
DIT=0
Not explicitly excluded, but ex-post target change has never taken place since the introduction
of the DIT=0.5
Explicitly excluded=1
8.  Are there procedures for the contingency of target overshooting?
No explicit rule = 0
Explicit rule triggered by more than two quarters of target overshooting or precisely specified
escape clauses =0.5
Explicit rule (including explanation given to national authorities, redundancy of central bankers,
interest action required in order to meet the target) triggered by no more than two quarters of
target overshooting =1
Appendix 3. Econometric Results
Testing for stationarity  of the  data  is  omitted mainly  due  to two  reasons: (1)  variables  are
already in first differences to capture interest rate movements rather than general trends in interest
rates and (2) the sample period is relatively short. For these two  reasons cointegration analysis is
also neglected.
14
The  estimation  of  equation  (2)  is  commenced  with  checking  for  structural  breaks,
heteroskedasticity  and  serial  correlation.  We  test  (2)  considering  various  sample  periods  that
corresponds with major structural changes in the policy environment in the examined countries. At
                                                          
14 Haldane and Read (2000) also neglect checking for the stationarity of the data and the cointegration analysis, although
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no case the differential intercepts prove to be significant, therefore a differential slope coefficient is
included.
The  White’s  test  for  heteroskedasticity  in  the  residuals  reveals  that  for  all  NMS  the  null
hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity in residuals is rejected for both 1-month and 3-month interest
rates. The detection of heteroskedasticity in the residuals means that although the OLS estimators
are still linear and unbiased they are no longer efficient, i.e. they are not BLUE. The consequence
of this violation is that standard errors, t statistics and F statistics are biased, therefore we cannot
interpret them (Verbeek, 2004). One of the remedies for the presence of heteroskedasticity may be
applying the method proposed by White (1980) who derived consistent covariance matrix estimator
allowing to interpret standard errors and the above mentioned statistics unless a problem of a
small  sample  is  faced.  Therefore,  by  using  this  method  corrected  standard  errors  and  the  t
statistics can be obtained.
The second test checks for the presence of serial correlation in the residuals. The Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test allows to check for autocorrelation of higher orders and it is still
valid if there is a lagged endogenous variable among explanatory variables.
15  The detection of
autocorrelation in the residuals for almost all NMS invalidates standard errors and both t-ratios and
F-statistics. Since we face problems with both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of residuals
we  apply  the  methodology  proposed  by  Newey  and  West  (1987).  This  extension  of  White’s
procedure  provides  us  with  heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent  (HAC)  robust
standard errors as well as well as t-and F-statistics (Verbeek, 2004 and Patterson, 2000).  
Czech Republic
Three  sample  periods  are  chosen  following  Matousek  and  Taci  (2003),  although  the  null
hypothesis of no structural change in the equations explaining 1-month and 3-month interest rates
cannot be rejected by the Chow test. However, the null hypothesis is rejected in the case of 6-
month interest rate at 1% significance level indicating a structural change in assumed periods. The
sample is divided into the following sub-samples: January 1, 1996–March 31, 1997; April 1, 1997–
December 31, 1997; and January 1, 1998–May 23, 2003.
The  first  period  predates  the  major  international  financial  crisis  (the  Asian  financial
crisis), which by itself is captured by the second period.  The 1997 crisis is extracted from the
overall sample because it caused significant instability of the Czech financial markets while leaving
Polish  and  Hungarian  markets  relatively  unscathed.    The  third  period  follows  the  crisis  and  it
coincides roughly with the pursuit of the DIT strategy that was enacted by the CNB in January
1998 (Matousek and Taci, 2003). However, one of the drawbacks of the Chow test is that it does
not inform whether the structural change is due to a slope coefficient, different intercepts or both. In
                                                          
15 Durbin-Watson statistics cannot be used under these circumstances. 
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order to address this issue and assess structural characteristics of the three sample periods, the
tested form of the model for the Czech Republic (estimated at different maturities) is prescribed as







t j j t j j t i D i D i i L i ε δ δ γ β α + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ 2 2 1 1 , , (10)
where  D1  and  D2  represent  dummy  variables  capturing  the  first  and  second  sample  periods
respectively,  thus  the  remaining  observations  correspond  with  the  third  period.  The  estimation
results of Equation (10) for two maturities are presented in Table A.3.1.
Table A.3.1. Estimation representations of Equation (10) for the Czech Republic
  Coefficients    
αβ 1 γδ 1 δ2 adj. R
2 F-test
-0.0013 0.1194 0.4740** 0.5311** -0.5493** 11.6661 PRIBOR 1m
[0.0193] [0.1480] [0.0789] [0.1123] [0.1722]
0.0211
0.0000
-0.0024 0.1572** 0.3136** 0.8336** -0.2116* 27.5505 PRIBOR 3m
[0.0092] [0.0780] [0.0753] [0.0969] [0.1095]
0.0509
0.0000
HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses; * indicates significance at 5%; ** indicates significance at 1%, second
rows for F-statistics represent p-values
Source: Own estimations
The results show that both parameters γ and δ are statistically significant, which means that
the  null  hypothesis  of  zero  coefficient  is  rejected.  The  interactive  dummy  variables  are  also
statistically  significant.  Since  estimated  δ2  coefficients  are  negative,  it  can  be  argued  that
transparency of the monetary policy has increased after the introduction of DIT.
Hungary
The empirical test of responses of market interest rates to the official rates in Hungary is based
on two sample periods: December 19, 1996–May 3, 2001; and May 4, 2001–May 23, 2003.  The
point of division reflects the day of the inception of DIT by the NBH.  Therefore, the structural
analysis reflecting differences in interest rate reactions during these two periods enables to assess
contribution of the new policy regime to financial stability relative to the stability under the previous
system that was based on exchange rate targeting.  Due to the identification of two periods only,
the tested function for Hungary is based on Equation (9) to allow for D to capture the pre-DIT
period. The results of the Equation (9) for two maturities are presented in Table A.3.2
The empirical evidence suggests that the NBH is not transparent and there is a marked decline
in transparency following the introduction of the DIT, as a parameter γ is significantly different from
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Table A.3.2. Estimation representations of Equation (9) for Hungary
  Coefficients    
αβ 1 γδ 1 adj. R
2 F-test
-0.0071* 0.1091 0.5667** -0.5478** 26.2798 BUDBOR 1m
[0.0031] [0.0836] [0.1866] [0.1993]
0.0434
0.0000
-0.0053* 0.2805** 0.5500** -0.5346** 91.6862 BUDBOR 3m
[0.0024] [0.0676] [0.1807] [0.1816]
0.1400
0.0000
HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses; * indicates significance at 5%; ** indicates significance at 1%; second
rows for F-statistics represent p-values
Source: Own estimations
Poland
The  empirical  analysis  of  the  model  for  Poland  is  based  on  the  extraction  of  two  sample
periods: January 1, 1996–June 3, 1998; and June 4, 1998–May 23, 2003.  The first sample period
predates the announcement of the DIT strategy, while the second period follows it. Thus the tested
function for Poland includes one dummy capturing the pre-DIT period.  There is also a dummy for









t j j t j j t i D i D i i L i ε δ δ γ β α + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ 2 2 1 1 , ,   (11)
where D1 and D2 represent dummy variables capturing the regime shift in monetary policy and
Y2K problem, respectively. The results of the Equation (11) for two maturities are presented in
Table A.3.3.
Table A.3.3. Estimation representations of Equation (11) for Poland
  Coefficients    
αβ 1 γδ 1 δ2 adj. R
2 F-test
-0.0038 0.2504*** 0.3199*** 0.2471* -0.3831** 87.8142 WIBOR 1m
[0.0042] [0.0648] [0.1282] [0.1323] [0.1274]
0.2029
0.0000
-0.0072** 0.2041*** 0.1848** 0.2054* -0.1528** 73.1434 WIBOR 3m
[0.0033] [0.0480] [0.0779] [0.1105] [0.0775]
0.1746
0.0000
HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses, * indicates significance at 10%, ** indicates significance at 5%, ***
indicates significance at 1%, second rows for F-statistics represent p-values
Source: Own estimations
                                                          
16 Market participants and general public were afraid of problems with liquidity that could occur as a consequence of
obsolete software possessed by some banks. 
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The empirical evidence suggests that the NBP is not transparent because a parameter γ is
significantly greater than zero. However, there is a statistically significant increase in transparency
in the monetary policy conduct following the introduction of  DIT, as δ1 is significant at 10% level
and has a positive sign.
ECB
The empirical analysis covers the period of January 1, 1999 – May 23, 2003. The empirical
test  for  the  Eurozone  does  not  include  a  regime  shift  dummy  variable,  as  there  has  been  no
change in the monetary policy strategy of the ECB in the analysed period.
() t
c
t j j t j j t i i L i ε γ β α + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ , , (12)
Table A.3.4 Estimation representations of Equation (12) for the ECB
  Coefficients    
αβ 1 γ adj. R
2 F-test




-0.0006 0.1526** 0.2064* 0.1300 86.3236 EURIBOR 3m
[0.0008] [0.0407] [0.0914]   0.0000
HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses; * indicates significance at 5%, ** indicates significance at 1%; second
rows for F-statistics represent p-values
Source: Own estimations
The empirical evidence suggests that the ECB is not transparent because a parameter γ is
significantly greater than zero, although its magnitude is slightly lower than for Poland.